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Abstract 
This article uses two ethnographic retail case studies to investigate contemporary workplace 
control. The findings highlight how flexible scheduling has serious consequences for workers 
and causes insecurity. This provides managers with a powerful and unaccountable mechanism 
for securing control. Benefits for managers of using flexible scheduling to secure control are 
shown to be its ambiguity and flexibility. Moreover, flexible scheduling creates an 
environment where workers must continually strive to maintain managers’ favour. Little 
evidence is found to suggest that this control is aided by work games obscuring workplace 
relations. Flexible scheduling does, however, enable misrecognition of workplace relations 
due to the schedule gifts which it entails. Schedule gifts act to bind workers to managers’ 
interests through feelings of gratitude and moral obligation. 
Key words 
Discipline, flexibility, job insecurity, labour process, scheduling, working time, workplace 
control  
Introduction  
Flexible scheduling is an increasingly common employment practice in the United States 
(US) and the United Kingdom (UK). In the US, 28% of workers report having schedules with 
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variable start and end times (Golden, 2005). A similar situation exists across Europe where 
around 35% of workers report facing changes in their work schedule (Parent-Thirion et al., 
2012). As a consequence, the benefits and drawbacks of flexible scheduling have been widely 
debated both in academic and policy circles and among the public. These discussions, 
however, have tended to focus on issues of job quality, work-life balance and well-being (for 
an overview see: Wood, 2016). The focus of this article is different, drawing attention instead 
to important but under-researched issues of managerial power and workplace control.  
Understanding the manner in which flexible scheduling influences control is critical 
as control represents an essential element of the employment relationship. The centrality of 
control derives from the fact that the employment relationship can never be entirely specified 
in advance. Rather, potential labour power is purchased for x price and y time but the exact 
details of the work are left vague and open-ended. This means that purchasers of labour 
power must ensure it is expended in line with their designs. Additionally, while the labour 
contract is ‘indeterminate’, the process of capital accumulation simultaneously generates a 
'structured antagonism' between capital and labour within the workplace owing to capital 
accumulation being necessitated upon exploitation (Edwards, 1986).  
This article builds upon previous studies which highlight the potential for managers to 
use flexible scheduling to punish workers. This is referred to as flexible discipline and is a 
particularly subtle form of power which can be easily modulated. However, this account goes 
further than previous research by demonstrating that flexible scheduling not only acts as a 
disciplining mechanism but also	  simultaneously obscures that domination. An original 
account of the ways in which ‘schedule gifts’ mystify workplace relations is developed with 
reference to Bourdieu’s (1977) discussion of Kabyle peasants’ gift economy.   
The article begins by reviewing the workplace control literature, linking it to 
	   3	  
contemporary labour market developments in the US and UK. Particular attention is paid to 
Burawoy’s (1979) influential insight that the realisation of profit requires not only securing 
control over the labour process but also obscuring workplace relations. However, Burawoy’s 
account of the manner in which workplace relations are obscured by work games has been 
criticised for being inadequately ‘relational’ (Mears, 2015). Therefore, an alternative is 
proposed based upon manager-controlled flexible scheduling. Building upon Bourdieu’s 
(1977) analysis of gift exchange, an original account of how workplace relations can be 
obscured by ‘schedule gifts’ is elucidated. It is argued that schedule gifts enable workers to 
overcome the insecurity inherent in ‘manager-controlled flexible scheduling’ (Wood, 2016) 
by meeting their material and social needs. However, the acceptance of schedule gifts 
obscures flexible scheduling as a source of control. The article uses two ethnographic case 
studies to investigate the role of manager-controlled flexible scheduling in aiding workplace 
control. Particular, attention is paid to elucidating the obscuring effects of work games and 
scheduling gifts respectively. 
Workplace Control   
Control in the 21st century 
The growth of occupations based around the provision of services has been a key feature of 
recent decades (Kalleberg, 2011). Temporal flexibility is a central component of many low-
end service sector jobs and is achieved through ‘manager-controlled flexible scheduling’ 
(Henly et al, 2006; Wood, 2016), whereby workplace managers vary ‘the number and timing 
of employees’ work hours' (Lambert, 2008: 1207). Wood and Burchell’s (2015) analysis of 
the 2005 and 2010 waves of the European Working Conditions Survey shows that the number 
of workers experiencing manager-controlled flexible scheduling increased in the UK by 7 
percentage points to 24% of the labour force. This equates to around seven million people in 
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the UK experiencing employer-controlled alterations to their schedules with little notice 
(Wood and Burchell, 2015). Wood and Burchell’s (2015) findings suggest that issues 
surrounding temporal flexibility in the UK are much wider than the media and policy focus 
upon zero hour contracts indicates (see also Wood, 2016). In fact, Wood’s (2016) findings 
support the contention of Rubery et al. (2005) that we may be witnessing a new flexible 
capitalist temporality. Moreover, manager-controlled flexible scheduling has been 
demonstrated to damage work-life balance (Henly and Lambert, 2014; Kalleberg, 2011; 
Wood, 2016) and has been suggested to constitute a form of job insecurity (Burchell, 2002; 
Standing, 1999; De Witte et al., 2010; Wood and Burchell, in press). 
In this context of temporal flexibility, what forms does workplace control take? A 
popular view in the 1990s was that contemporary control was achieved through electronic 
surveillance technology which enabled the realisation of Foucault's (1977) ‘panopticon’. 
However, such arguments were critically evaluated in, what became known as, the 'call centre 
debate'. The debate empirically demonstrates that the notion of ‘the electronic panopticon’ to 
be overly simplistic: it conceptually overstates the dominance of surveillance and 
underestimates workers’ capacity for resistance (Thompson and van den Broek, 2010).  
An obvious alternative is that workplace control is enabled by manager-controlled 
flexible scheduling. This method of scheduling affords managers a high level of discretionary 
control over working-time, even enabling real-time adjustments to schedules (Lambert, 
2008). However, this control also affords managers significant arbitrary power over workers’ 
work-life balance and the quality of their job (Wood, 2016). This provides managers with a 
potentially powerful despotic means of ensuring general control. Heyes’ (1997) study of a 
chemical plant, provides evidence of manager-controlled flexible scheduling extending 
managerial control in this manner. Beynon (1973: 146) demonstrates how, at Ford, 
	   5	  
supervisors’ control over the allocation of overtime led to workers being ‘in the supervisors’ 
pocket. If he doesn’t behave, or if the supervisor just doesn’t happen to “like” him, he can 
lose his overtime for a week or forever.’ More recently Gottfried (1992) and Chun (2001) 
found similar mechanisms in the temporary help and micro-chip assembly industries, as did 
Price (2016) in the Australian retail sector.  
However, the suggestion that workplace control can be maintained simply through the 
disciplining effects of manager-controlled flexible scheduling supposes a one-dimensional 
view of control. Granovetter (2005) builds on Weber’s ([1922] 1978) insights regarding the 
high costs of maintaining control through coercion. Granovetter argues that when a complex 
division labour exists, surveillance and, thus, punishment is actually difficult and costly to 
undertake. Therefore, systems of control tend to be based upon the legitimisation of 
workplace relations and the production of consent through social group dynamics. As 
Burawoy (1979) demonstrates, control is maintained not only by managers actively securing 
it but because workplace relations are simultaneously obscured. In other words, if workers 
recognised that they were being exploited, they would resist that exploitation.  
Burawoy’s (1979) investigation of workplace games is perhaps the most influential 
example of how consent is generated out of group interaction. In his classic ethnographic 
study of a Chicago machine shop, Burawoy details the obscuring of exploitation through the 
‘game of making out'. In playing this game, workers attempt to reach a piece rate which 
maximises their earnings without causing management to re-rate the job to make the rate 
harder to achieve. Workers initially enter into work games in order to counter the weariness, 
tedium and arduousness of meaningless work and to make time pass quickly. Although 
workers initiate these games independently, Burawoy highlights how managers play an 
important role in determining their sustainability by ensuring sufficient certainty within the 
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workplace that workers can become engrossed by such games without fear of sanctions. 
Group dynamics, in the form of social pressure, are shown to provide an essential incentive to 
play ‘the same game with more or less the same rules’ (Burawoy, 2012: 193). Scores were 
collectively tracked and formed a major topic of workplace discussion. The continual peer-to-
peer evaluation of how well each other is playing the game made it difficult to opt out 
without being ostracised. Thus, the work game was constituted by socially sanctioned and 
enforced rules meaning that ‘making out' became an end in itself beyond that of making more 
money (Burawoy, 1979).  
Playing the ‘game of making out’ not only involves working hard to produce goods 
for the firm but, in doing so, workers simultaneously produce their own consent to the 
prevailing workplace relations. As Burawoy (2012: 7-8) put it, ‘the very act of playing the 
game simultaneously produce[s] consent to its rules. You can’t be serious about playing a 
game... if, at the same time, you question its rules and goals.’ Other researchers have also 
highlighted the importance of work games. Burawoy (1979) cites Donald Roy, as finding 
work games in the same machine shop 30 years earlier. Roy (1959) also details a work game 
in his study of a garment factory, involving cutting certain quantities of particular colours and 
shapes. Durand and Stewart (1998) describe a quite different work game in a Japanese-style 
plant, in which workers feign transparency and openness with regards to their work practices 
and skills while secretly seeking to hide their true knowledge and skills from management. 
Pollert (1981) demonstrates how work games can be almost entirely based around group 
dynamics, as opposed to the labour process which other researchers focused upon. Pollert 
(1981) uncovers a highly absorbing sexualised work game in which female tobacco 
operatives flirt, tease and poke fun at male supervisors. This game 'was a complex, tense 
balance between confrontation and collaboration… [With] failure in the game lead[ing] to the 
sanction of being more likely to receive arbitrary victimisation' (Pollert, 1981: 141-144). 
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More recently, work games have also been highlighted in service sector research. 
Leidner (1993) demonstrates the importance of sales games for fast food workers. Sallaz 
(2009; 2015) elucidates a ‘tipping game’ among Las Vegas casino dealers and a ‘learning 
game’ among call centre workers. Given the importance of flexible working time in 
contemporary service sector workplaces, we might expect work games, structured around 
time, to play an important role in maintaining control. Such time-based work games have 
been uncovered by Beynon (1973); Heyes (1997) and Peng (2011), albeit not in the service 
sector. Beynon (1973: 118) describes how workers ‘worked back the line’ to ‘make their own 
time’ in which they could rest and interact socially.2 Heyes (1997) details temporal work 
games in which workers make strategic use of absences in order to make gains in overtime. 
Peng (2011) highlights how Chinese textile workers engage in a game centred on gaining 
leisure time by achieving their work tasks quickly. 
However, Mears (2015) has argued the need to go beyond work games and what she 
calls the ‘situational construction of consent’, and instead place even greater emphasis upon 
the relational nature of control. Mears (2015: 1101) highlights the manner in which 
‘meanings of work are also shaped through relationships and social ties beyond the 
accomplishment of work activities.’ In particular, she draws on Mauss’ ([1954] 2002) seminal 
work on gifts to elucidate the power of gifts in the exploitation of ‘girls’ in VIP nightclubs. 
For example, by providing a ‘free’ expensive dinner, promoters created an obligation that 
women both attend and stay at a particular nightclub.  
Mauss ([1954] 2002) famously argued that there was no such thing as a free or pure 
gift; he showed how in reality, all gifts come with the obligation of reciprocation and thus act 
to strengthen bonds of social solidarity. For Mauss, the expectations created by the exchange 
of gifts are largely recognised by both parties. Bourdieu (1977) develops Mauss’ argument by 
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demonstrating that the power relations underpinning gifts are, in fact, often misrecognised by 
both the giver and receiver. The true power of gifts, Bourdieu (1977) argues, lies not in their 
reciprocation but in the inability of the less powerful party to fully reciprocate. Bourdieu 
(1977) illustrates this process through the giving of gifts amongst Kabyle peasants in northern 
Algeria. He shows how the provision of gifts, which cannot be reciprocated, binds the 
receiver to giver through emotional debt and a sense of moral obligation, while shrouding the 
act as a gesture of generosity. Such gift-based power relations are especially prevalent when 
developed institutions which maintain domination in other forms are absent (Bourdieu, 
1990). Misrecognition is the foundation upon which the power of gifts rests, and is also 
central to understanding workplace relations (Bourdieu, 2000). In a similar fashion to 
Burawoy (1979), Bourdieu (2000) argues that a necessary condition for the existence of 
labour is workers’ subjective misrecognition of their objective exploitation (Burawoy, 2012).  
In the context of manager-controlled flexible scheduling, it is possible that managers 
might provide workers with, what I term, ‘schedule gifts.’ The giving of additional hours 
helps provide for workers’ material needs, as more hours directly increase hourly-paid 
workers’ wages. Additionally, benevolent alterations to schedules can help provide for 
workers’ social needs by enabling work-life balance (Henley and Lambert, 2014; Smith and 
Elliot, 2010). These gifts thus enable the overcoming of schedule insecurity. However, by 
accepting schedule gifts, flexible discipline as a mechanism of control is obscured. Support 
for the concept of schedule gifts can be found in a study of care workers by Rubery et al. 
(2015). These researchers find high levels of gratitude are generated by managers’ attempts to 
improve workers’ schedules.  
Method and Cases 
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A multiple case cross-national ethnographic approach was followed and the retail sector 
chosen as an exemplar of low-end service sector employment. One employer being in the 
UK, referred to as ShopPLC, and one in the US, referred to as RetailCorp. These firms were 
selected as they shared similar profiles in terms of their domestic market position, yet 
seemingly contrasting workplace regimes. ShopPLC appeared closer to Burawoy’s (1979) 
archetypical hegemonic regime with a recognised trade union, collective bargaining and a 
fairly stable and harmonious industrial relations climate. Contrastingly, RetailCorp seemed to 
represent a more despotic regime being famed for its hostility towards, avoidance of, and 
conflict with unions, along with its low pay and poor benefits.  
These two firms are representative of more general differences in the UK and US 
employment systems. The strength of private sector unions in the UK has drastically declined 
over the past 30 years, nevertheless, they remain significantly stronger than their US 
counterparts. The UK also features greater statutory labour rights and protections, an 
important case in point being the prevalence of ‘at-will employment’ in the US. Accordingly, 
in the US most employees can be dismissed for any reason and without just cause or notice. 
Likewise, most US workers are scheduled at-will: the quantity and timing of scheduling 
being entirely at the discretion of management. In effect, the majority of low-end employees 
in the US are employed on a zero hours basis (Kalleberg, 2011) whereas this remains fairly 
uncommon in the UK and was not utilised at ShopPLC.  
Given the greater labour protections and potential for collective voice, it might be 
expected that workers in the UK would have greater control over flexible scheduling. 
However, Wood (2016) demonstrates that even when workplace institutions exist which 
ostensibly facilitate collective voice and worker-controlled flexible scheduling, the ability of 
workers to actually influence their scheduling is ultimately dependent upon bargaining 
power. The research was undertaken at a time of abnormally high unemployment, 
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underemployment and employment insecurity in both the UK and US which weakened 
workers’ bargaining power. Therefore, despite the contextual differences outlined above, 
manager-controlled flexible scheduling was prevalent at both. As a consequence, workers' 
schedules varied widely in number and timing at both companies. At the US case, manager-
controlled flexible scheduling was achieved through the direct scheduling of workers on a 
three-week basis, equivalent to zero hours employment. More complex mechanisms operated 
at the UK case, yet manager-controlled flexible scheduling was similarly prevalent (see 
Wood (2016) for an in-depth discussion).   
 The US fieldwork was carried out in California –in the Los Angeles and San 
Francisco Bay areas. Data collection at RetailCorp involved two intensive observational 
fieldwork trips totalling six weeks. Documentary data, such as the staff policy handbook, 
staff magazine, were also collected. This experiential, observational and documentary data 
was supported by 42 semi-structured interviews with 33 informants consisting of:  24 non-
managerial hourly-paid employees (four of whom had recently left RetailCorp); one recently 
terminated salaried assistant manager; seven union organisers; and one senior union official 
(conducted over Skype as he was based in Washington D.C).  
 The UK fieldwork was conducted over a longer period between June 2012 and June 
2013 in London. Interviews were conducted with 19 workers at four ShopPLC hypermarkets. 
All but one of these workers were union members and nine were workplace trade union 
representatives (union reps). Observation was undertaken at two of these hypermarkets and 
two additional stores. Interviews were also undertaken with 10 union reps, each from a 
different store. Additionally, six regional union officials were interviewed and notes taken 
from meetings with two senior members of the union leadership. In total 39 semi-structured 
interviews were undertaken with 35 ShopPLC informants.  
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 Towards the end of the research, an opportunity to gain a deeper insight into the lived 
experience of work at ShopPLC presented itself. Such experiential knowledge has proved 
invaluable for understanding the nature of workplace control. Therefore, two months of 
participant observation at the Mulling Point hypermarket (a pseudonym) in North London 
were undertaken. The Mulling Point store had a workforce of approximately 200 employees. 
This participant observation involved working 8.5 contracted hours per week as a shelf-
stacker. Work issues were also discussed with colleagues in the canteen before the shifts 
began and during the train commute to work. To complement the interviews and 
observational data, a union official also provided copies of the official guides to ‘flexible 
contracts’ and ‘labour matching’ and the collective agreement. 
 Institutional gatekeepers, in the form of unions and a manager, played an important 
role in gaining access to the cases. Unfortunately, the use of union gatekeepers meant it was 
not possible to achieve saturation of managers’ views. This is a limitation of the study but not 
a fatal one; the principle interest was workers’ experiences and perceptions of control.   
Findings and discussion 
Flexible discipline 
As suggested by Burchell (2002), De Witte (2010), Standing (1999), and Wood and Burchell 
(in press), manager-controlled flexible scheduling led to widespread experiences of 
insecurity. As Rachel (worker, RetailCorp) explained: 
‘You are just wondering like oh my God are they going to change my hours, are they 
going to cut my hours next week, am I going to have enough money for my rent next 
week?’  
 Managers were free to cause distress to specific workers simply by altering their schedule to 
unsocial hours or to times which clashed with childcare, social activities, education or a 
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second job. Alternatively, managers could cut the number of hours a worker received, thus 
reducing their income, or they could increase working time instability and unpredictability. 
As suggested by Heyes (1997), managers not only had control over workers while they were 
in the workplace but also wielded significant influence over workers' home lives too, as 
Francisco (worker, RetailCorp) explained:  
 'If they change your time, every time that you go to work and they change your day off 
that means that they own your life already because they let you work any time they 
want, any day they want and you know you can’t even plan for your life.’  
The extension of this power beyond the realm of the workplace led another RetailCorp 
worker, Brad, to equate manager-controlled flexible scheduling to slavery: 
'I would compare it almost to feeling like a slave because your power to control your 
own life is taken from you; they are going to make you [work] whenever… they 
want…it essentially makes you feel like at any point you can be pulled away from your 
family and your life to do what your boss wants you to do… You can’t plan anything… 
It affects you whether you’re single, married with kids whatever because it does just 
take all the organisation out of your life.’ 
Not only did manager-controlled flexible scheduling provide managers with 
discretionary power over workers’ lives, but some employees in both workforces believed 
managers used it to punish workers if they were not flexible, productive or obedient enough. 
This created fear amongst workers: if they displeased their managers, their hours would be 
cut or schedules altered. Akira (former worker, RetailCorp) elaborated on this common 
theme: 
'You’re disciplined like a child, like you would punish your 12-year-old “I'm going to 
take your hours, I'm gonna take your days because you spoke back.”’ 
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Likewise, Tony (ShopPLC, union official) commented: 
‘“If I challenge [managers]… I might not get the overtime… or might not get my 
Sundays, or the hours I'm doing at the moment are perfect I can finish at two, I can go 
home and pick up the kids... if I make a fuss I might have that taken away or I'll have 
my hours changed, so if I keep my head down and do as I'm told I'll keep those hours.”' 
The subtlety of flexible discipline  
Flexible scheduling is instigated for cost containment rather than control (Lambert, 2008). 
Nevertheless, it does place a large amount of power in the hands of managers who can 
potentially use their discretion to cause significant suffering to specific workers. Managers 
can in effect discipline workers without recourse to formal disciplinary mechanisms, and thus 
it represents a radical extension of the power of managers. In reality, how frequently 
managers took advantage of this situation is impossible to infer conclusively from the data 
available, but the informants certainly perceived that they did, and, with regard to control, it 
is this perception which matters.  
 For their part, managers pleaded innocence, informing workers that they had no 
choice but to alter schedules due to staffing needs set by head office and based upon 
projected sales. Although workers frequently disbelieved this, it does point to the inherent 
ambiguity involved in securing control via scheduling - a major advantage for management. 
For example, a worker's schedule may, over a number of years, be fairly stable until they do 
something which displeases management; then they can suddenly find that their working time 
becomes highly unstable and unpredictable. In this situation, it seems highly plausible to the 
worker that they are being disciplined. However, it is not easy for them to resist; the change 
could be a coincidental result of alterations to projected sales by head office which their 
manager is simply responding to. When the majority of workers experience some degree of 
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instability in their hours, it is even harder to establish whether such alterations were acts of 
discipline. Consequently, it was almost impossible for workers to know whether to blame 
their manager or the whims of market forces. Flexible discipline, therefore, emerges as an 
ambiguous form of control and one that is less damaging to the 'psychological contract' than 
threats of dismissal. Colin, a worker at ShopPLC, illustrated this particularly clearly. He 
stated that, despite being very distressed that his job had been changed to nights, he did not 
blame management: 
'I do understand they need [to meet] certain [customer] demand and obviously, I'm just 
the unlucky one that mine happened to go to nights.'  
At RetailCorp, the subtlety of this manner of control proved especially useful for 
surreptitiously disciplining workers who joined the worker association, and many workers 
felt this was a barrier to the growth of the association. Kim (worker, RetailCorp) explained 
why:    
‘If I go to an event [organised by the worker association] and I’m out there and they 
[managers] find out, I will find out the next week over that I’ve been slashed 10 hours 
or so and my hours would have been steady at 32 hours for like a couple of months and 
then all of sudden an activity comes about and my hours get slashed.’   
As one of the union's lead organisers explained, it was very difficult to combat this form of 
punishment: 
'It’s hard to distinguish if it is complete retaliation or if it is just what RetailCorp 
usually does... their schedule is X, then they do something publicly and their schedule 
changes… they are probably trying to mess with you because they know that you can't 
work that shift... but that's not something that you can necessarily prove... coz then we'd 
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have to make the argument that their hours have never changed before and that's not the 
nature of retail.’ - Valentina (union organiser, RetailCorp). 
 Moreover, dismissing someone is rigid in its immutability. Conversely, to cut or alter 
a worker's schedule can easily be rescinded, making it a much more flexible means of 
discipline. This flexibility also means that the punishment can be modulated and reduced over 
time unlike the binary nature of dismissal / non-dismissal.   
The absence of work games 
If the workplaces were being secured via flexible discipline, that is alterations to schedules, 
how were workplace relations obscured? Given the large body of literature stressing the role 
of work games, it was expected that they would be evident at ShopPLC and RetailCorp. In 
fact, Leidner (1993) and Sallaz (2015) provided evidence for the importance of the obscuring 
effects of work games in similar service sector settings (fast food restaurants and call centres, 
respectively). Moreover, considering, the importance of temporal flexibility, it was expected 
that work games might involve time, in a similar fashion as those identified by Beynon 
(1973), Heyes (1997), and Peng (2011). Yet at RetailCorp and ShopPLC, such games were 
surprisingly absent.  
Leidner (1993) demonstrates the importance of incentives, such as bonuses or even 
symbolic prizes such as music albums etc., for the constitution of work games. One 
explanation for the absence of work games is that neither RetailCorp nor ShopPLC 
incentivised them. For example, at RetailCorp, informants explained how they tried to 
constitute their work as a race, regarding either their scan rate when operating the check-outs 
or the speed at which they could empty their pallets of goods when restocking shelves. They 
even occasionally discussed their scores and strategies with their co-workers. However, these 
attempts to create games were undermined by managers. For example, pins which were 
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supposed to be given to check-out workers who achieved fast scan rates, and would thereby 
enable them to keep score, were not given out. In another instance, managers told workers 
that the number of pallets of goods they put out was unimportant, as the amount of stock on 
each pallet varied. Thus, the basis of the game was again undermined as workers were once 
more deprived of a means of keeping score. Moreover, contrary to Sallaz’s (2015) findings, 
workers at ShopPLC and RetailCorp did not have to struggle to become competent at 
customer interaction nor did they experience intense social pressure to improve this area of 
their work. Consequently, there was no basis for ‘learning games.’ 
Schedule gifts   
Flexible scheduling, however, was not just a tool which managers could utilise as and when 
needed in order to punish specific workers. It also constituted an active and constant 
structuration of the workplace environment so that all workers needed to constantly strive to 
maintain the favour of managers. As Brad at RetailCorp put it: 
‘Pretty much everyone feels that if you are on the good side of a manager they will give 
you more hours, give you better shifts.’ 
 At ShopPLC, workers were afraid that if they displeased their manager their schedules would 
suffer. Derek (union rep, ShopPLC) explained that:  
‘They are terrified of not getting any more shifts and being stuck with this three-and-a- 
half or seven hours a week, which they’ve gotta live on... Being desperate for some 
extra hours, they depend on the mood of the manager for their income… once your face 
doesn't fit you don't get any more hours.’  
 Managers had the capacity to give workers they liked more hours (including full-time 
status), the shifts which they desired and greater schedule stability, albeit within the 
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constraints of staffing needs and their labour budget. Moreover, scheduling was a zero-sum 
game: any benefits which one worker gained were at the expense of others who, as a 
consequence, would either receive fewer, less stable or less desirable hours. Unsurprisingly, 
scheduling was perceived as operating according to favouritism. Therefore, workers tried to 
gain favour with their manager, in some cases by boosting their productivity by undertaking 
extra tasks or working off-the-clock. For example, I observed at Mulling Point how Denise, a 
worker who often received overtime, tended to start work 15 minutes early and continued 
working after her shift had finished. At RetailCorp, Gabriella explicitly stated that the logic 
behind extra work effort was to try and gain the favour of managers so that they would help 
with the worker's scheduling:  
‘Sometimes we think that in doing our work they are gonna make it better, they are 
gonna make it up to us if they see us working hard.’      
Working hard, or doing extra tasks to gain a manager’s favour in the hope of assistance with 
scheduling, was something which José, a RetailCorp union organiser, also claimed was 
common amongst the workers he spoke to: 
‘Some workers do try and do that [gain a manager’s favour by doing extra tasks]. I 
spoke to someone the other day who was like: “When I first started I used to do a lot of 
extra stuff for RetailCorp and the time came for them to cut hours and I went to the 
manager who I’d done all this extra stuff for.”’ 
Nicola, a former assistant manager at RetailCorp, supported the workers' view that managers 
at RetailCorp used their control over schedules as a way to secure high productivity:  
‘If they are part-time and they have performance issues, I know that managers would 
look at giving that person less hours than a worker that performed better.’ 
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The process of gaining favour also personalised this mechanism of control which had 
important implications for the obscuring of workplace relations. Leonardo, a worker at 
RetailCorp, explained that if workers did not plead to managers they would not get enough 
hours. A more detailed account of this common experience was provided by another 
RetailCorp worker, Joe: 
‘Before they used to cut my hours but now I can go to a manager… there are times 
they’ve scheduled me for 16 hours, and I went to her and she fixed them.’ 
Vincent, a RetailCorp worker, provides an illustrative example of the level of desperation 
which this pleading could amount to: 
'I'm always constantly asking for a full-time position... I've told my store manager “it's 
literally getting hard for me to put food on my table and pay my bills, can I get a full-
time position?”'  
The requirement for workers to go to their manager and ask them for help personalised 
the scheduling experience. Without this personalisation, the scheduling experience would 
have consisted of little more than the worker collecting a printout of their schedule which had 
been calculated according to predictions of demand and drawn up a thousand miles away in 
the head office. Therefore, when managers acceded to workers' requests and accommodated 
their needs, it appeared as a personal act of kindness. As Gabriella explained: 
'It’s just temporary fixes, but then the person feels so grateful that the manager has 
given them the hours. But next week you have to worry again.' 
This kindness, however, could not be repaid directly and thus had the potential to create an 
emotional debt.  
	   19	  
'Sure I have [felt grateful]... not [to] management in particular... but when a particular 
manager says, you know, “sit down, let’s take a look at your schedule and see what we 
can do” then I'm grateful to that guy or gal.' (Seb, worker RetailCorp) 
Moreover, managers’ acts of kindness could only ever be ‘temporary fixes’ owing to the need 
to schedule workers flexibly to meet demand. Accordingly, the workers’ gratitude could be 
regenerated on a weekly basis.  
Investigating the misrecognition of this process required more experiential and 
textured observation of interactions in the workplace. This was made possible through 
participant observation of working at ShopPLC. While working as a shelf stacker at the 
Mulling Point hypermarket it was observed that managers would encourage workers to beg 
them for additional hours, making vague promises that more hours were available or soon 
would be. For example, one manager claimed: 
'“I always have some overtime so let me know if you want any” - this was despite my 
entire work team being employed on less than nine hours a week and all desiring more 
hours and, in some cases, to be made full-time’ (Fieldnotes, ShopPLC). 
Such claims created an expectation among workers that more hours would be available to 
them if and when they wanted them. For example, one of my co-workers claimed that he had 
only taken the job based on the assumption that he would be getting more hours. Another 
poignant example is provided by Jackie: 
 ‘It’s strange because you speak to the staff and they say their department is short [of 
staff] but when you ask the manager they say “there isn’t any at the moment but keep 
putting your name down for overtime.” I’m just getting a few hours here and there.’  
Similar expectations were created more generally at ShopPLC as Bryah, a union rep at 
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another store, explained: 
‘The way they say it is that “we employ you for 10 hours but you may get 25 hours a 
week” - you may - it may not always happen.’  
 In order to explore the effect of the capricious environment created by these vague 
promises of more hours, it is instructive to compare my own experience with that of my 
closest colleague Rio. Despite my best efforts not to work overly hard and to be considered 
an average worker, I was, nevertheless, a favourite. Favouritism manifested itself in the fact 
that, like other favourites, I was routinely offered additional hours while Rio was not. Rio 
was desperate for additional hours and had told our manager during his interview that the 
core hours on which he was hired were insufficient for him to make-ends-meet. In fact, he 
claimed to have explicitly told the manager not take him on unless ShopPLC could provide 
him with additional hours. Moreover, managers allowed me to rearrange my schedule even 
when this broke company policy. For my part, my personal commitment to not working hard 
was undermined by the realities of being a favourite in a workplace practising manager-
controlled flexible scheduling. To take one example: I was scheduled to work on both 
Christmas Eve and New Year’s Eve at a time when it was company policy that no-one be 
granted leave on either of these days. This was a major problem as I needed to travel on 
Christmas Eve to be with my family on Christmas Day. I had also booked a holiday over the 
New Year before being employed by ShopPLC. However, when I brought these problems up 
with my manager, he casually replied that it was 'no problem' to change my hours on 
Christmas Eve and to take New Year's Eve off. Moreover, he appeared genuinely concerned 
by my predicament. When this manager then came to check on my progress with the work 
tasks (which he had personally set me), I felt guilt that I had not achieved what he had asked 
of me. I found myself feeling an emotional debt to him and a moral obligation to increase my 
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work effort.  
What this example demonstrates is the manner in which scheduling gifts obscure the 
role of manager-controlled flexible scheduling in securing control. I felt gratitude to the 
manager and identified with his interests (the completion of the work tasks which he 
oversaw). Thus manager-controlled flexible scheduling is not only a mechanism which forces 
workers to accede to managers' wishes but also actively integrates workers into achieving 
managerial aims. It binds workers to work hard for their manager through a sense of gratitude 
and obligation to repay them for their ‘kindness.’ Even with a sociological understanding of 
the exploitative nature of labour processes and my commitment as a researcher not to work 
hard, the work no longer appeared to me as labour, but rather as a moral obligation to my 
manager due to his acts of ‘kindness’. Under such conditions, employment is not experienced 
as simply the impersonal exchange of X money for Y labour, but rather relationally as the 
need to repay, what appear to be, managers’ acts of compassion, caring and friendship.  
Manager-controlled flexible scheduling was thus a powerful yet subtle mechanism of 
control at both RetailCorp and ShopPLC; securing control by extending arbitrary managerial 
power and obscuring that control through misrecognition of workplace relations. Bourdieu 
(1977) found that the economic relations (gifts) of Kabyle peasants simultaneously obscured 
the domination of that very same economic system. Likewise, at ShopPLC and RetailCorp, 
manager-controlled flexible scheduling not only secured control of the workplace but also 
obscured its role as a source of control.  
The argument above does not, however, rest upon an assumption that managers 
purposefully manipulate workers through scheduling gifts. They could just as well bestow 
these gifts out of genuine concern and a desire to help. However, in doing so, the role of 
flexible scheduling as a mechanism of control is often obscured from them too. In fact, 
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Bourdieu (1977) argues that gift exchange requires that the dominator deceives themselves 
just as much as the dominated. The present article focuses on the experiences of workers for 
pragmatic methodological reasons, therefore, it is unable to cast much light upon managerial 
perceptions of their actions, although this is an important avenue for future research.2 Finally, 
it must be noted that the findings reported above have, due to space limitations, necessarily 
focused upon control but this should not be taken as evidence that control was total and 
resistance absent. Future research will highlight the contradictions and limits to this control, 
highlighting both hidden and overt resistance to it. 
Conclusions  
Flexible scheduling has been a highlighted by a number of researchers as providing managers 
with a means to secure control in a variety of work settings (Beynon, 1973; Chun, 2001; 
Gottfried, 1992; Heyes, 1997; Price, 2016). This article demonstrates the manner in which 
‘flexible discipline’ significantly increases the discretionary power of managers. Enabling 
managers to flexibly discipline workers outside of formal procedures by causing significant 
distress to specific workers through the altering of schedules. These alterations force workers 
to work at times which clash with their home life, and reduces their income and ability to 
plan. A major strength of flexible discipline as a mechanism workplace control is its subtlety 
and ambiguity. With it being hard for workers to discern whether they are actually being 
disciplined and, as a result, whether the blame for their suffering lies with their manager or 
the omnipotent workings of the market. This ambiguity reduces the damage to psychological 
contracts and makes it easier for managers to rescind punishment. Flexible discipline, 
therefore, represents a more nuanced means of securing control than traditional disciplinary 
methods, offering managers the possibility to modulate and adjust the severity of punishment. 
	   23	  
However, to focus only only on discipline and coercion would entail a one-
dimensional view of control (Burawoy, 1979; 2012; Granovetter, 2005; Weber [1922] 1978). 
When a complex division of labour exists, surveillance and, thus discipline, become difficult 
and costly. Therefore, workplace control tends also to require legitimisation and the creation 
of consent (Burawoy, 1979; 2012; Granovetter, 2005). Following Burawoy’s (1979) classic 
study, much of the extant literature assumes the legitimisation of control necessitates the 
obscuring of workplace relations through the playing of ‘work games’ (Burawoy, 1979; 
Durand and Stewart, 1998; Heyes 1997; Leidner, 1993; Peng, 2011; Pollert, 1981; Sallaz, 
2009; 2015). Despite the expectation that work games, potentially based around the flexible 
nature of working time, would play an important role in aiding workplace control, this study 
found little evidence to support this assumption. In fact, the focus on work games has been 
criticised by Mears (2015) who argues for the need to go beyond ‘situational construction of 
consent’ and instead place even greater emphasis upon the relational nature of control.  
This article builds upon Mears (2015) to elucidate the potential of gifts to act as an 
alternative control mechanism to work games. Flexible scheduling does not simply constitute 
a disciplinary tool as suggested by previous studies (see for example: Chun, 2001; Gottfried, 
1992; Price, 2016). It also simultaneously obscures workplace relations by enabling the 
giving and receiving of ‘schedule gifts’. Work environments which entail high levels of 
manager-controlled flexible scheduling necessitate that workers actively and constantly beg 
managers for schedules to be altered and more hours granted. The acquiescence by managers 
to a particular worker’s needs is ‘misrecognised’ (Bourdieu, 1977) by the worker as an act of 
kindness which they are unable to reciprocate. The inability of the worker to reciprocate the 
schedule gift binds them to the manager through an emotional debt and sense of moral 
obligation, while shrouding the manager’s act as a gesture of generosity and kindness. 
Consequently, this article makes an important theoretical contribution to our understanding of 
	   24	  
workplace relations by elucidating the manner in which manager-controlled flexible 
scheduling simultaneously secures and obscures control in the temporally flexible workplace 
of the 21st century.  
Flexible disciple and schedule gifts have an applicability to a wide range of 
contemporary low-end workplaces. Despite the focus upon zero hours contracts as a 
particularly despotic and exploitative form of flexibility, this article demonstrates that this 
can also be true of wider flexible scheduling practices. ShopPLC and RetailCorp were 
selected specifically because they appeared to represent contrasting workplace regimes. The 
fact that manager-controlled flexible scheduling was central to control at both adds further 
weight to the proposition that the control function of flexible scheduling may be widespread. 
However, further research is necessary to understand how general the findings are beyond the 
specific spatial and temporal contexts from which they were derived – low-end retail 
employment in three global cities during a period of labour market crisis. Additionally, 
research is needed to shed light upon the degree to which managers are aware of this control 
function of flexible scheduling, and whether it is a deliberate management strategy. It is 
important to stress, however, that the theory developed by this article is not dependent on 
control being a deliberate conscious strategy on behalf of managers. Indeed, it is held that this 
is improbable.   
Acknowledgments 
I would like to thank Brendan Burchell and William Brown for their constructive comments 
on the original version of this article and their intellectual generosity, help and support over a 
number of years. I would also like to thank Huw Beynon, Paul Edwards and Michael 
Burawoy for their encouragement and detailed comments on earlier drafts. This article has 
benefited from being presented at numerous conferences and workshops but particular thanks 
	   25	  
are due to Rachel Cohen and Guglielmo Meardi who provided thoughtful comments and 
encouragement at the 2013 Work, Employment and Society PhD workshop. Finally, I am 
indebted to the detailed feedback and suggestions provided by the three anonymous 
reviewers and the editor Shireen Kanji whose comments have significantly improved the 
article.  
Funding  
This research was supported by funding from the Economic and Social Research Council 
(grant numbers ES/I017011/1 and ES/I901957/1). 
Notes 
1.   I am indebted to Huw Beynon for pointing out this finding of his research to me.  
2.    The account provided by Smith and Elliot (2010) suggests that schedule gifts result 
from genuine attempts by managers to help workers reconcile life-work conflict and 
managers are oblivious to this control function. This account supports Bourdieu’s 
(1977) assertion that the exchange of gifts leaves the dominator just as deceived as the 
dominated.           
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